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Modes of Thinking in Corporate Governance:   
In Search of Root Causes of Corporate Governance Malfunctioning  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that the current two prevailing modes of thinking in corporate 
governance, the inward-looking and outward-looking modes of thinking, severely limit and 
constrain our understandings of corporate governance systems and problems and are thus 
unable to properly diagnose and rectify corporate governance defects and malfunctions in 
practice. The paper presents a new mode of thinking, i.e., the critically reflexive mode of 
thinking, to overcome the limitations of the current modes of thinking, such as the assumed 
hard boundary between the internal and external governance systems, a simplistic “either or” 
approach to look into core corporate governance problems. The new mode of thinking 
suggests that the core corporate governance issues are not purely from inside the corporation, 
nor solely from outside the corporation. Rather, they actually reside at the intersection of 
internal and external governance spheres interplayed by corporate powers and political, 
market and other key stakeholder players. Illustrated by three key exemplary theses, the 
critically reflexive mode of thinking shows fundamental different understandings among the 
three modes of thinking. This mode of thinking points to a new direction in corporate 
governance research and a clearer agenda for effective corporate governance reforms.   
 
Keywords: 
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Modes of Thinking in Corporate Governance:   
In Search of Root Causes of Corporate Governance Malfunctioning  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A commonplace observation is that corporate governance has largely failed in practice 
(e.g., Sun et al., 2011). This has been proved by a series of fraudulent scandals, corporate 
failures and irresponsible behaviours over a few of decades, particularly the scandals of 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others around 2002, and corporate failures during the 2008 
financial crisis. Corporate governance not just failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, but 
actually contributed to the crisis (e.g., Clarke, T., 2011; OECD, 2009; Tomasic, 2011). Since 
the financial crisis, despite a wave of new regulations and corporate governance codes in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, among other countries, corporate governance 
problems in the financial industry, as the then Governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King 
pointed out, remain the same (The Telegraph, 05 March 2011). These include the remorseless 
pursuit of short-term profit, excessive bonuses (even coming from taxpayers’ money), banks’ 
routine exploitation of their millions of customers and living in a “too-big-to-fail” world. 
King warned that, without reforming the banks to tackle the fundamental governance issues, 
another financial crisis will be inevitable. Furthermore, corporate scandals like corruptions, 
money laundering, oil leaks, phone hacking, horse meat, and inadequate risk management 
have continued to occur. Corporate misbehaviours and wrongdoings have not just appeared in 
a few of companies; rather, they were often seen industry-wide, nationwide or even 
worldwide.  
Corporate governance research has started as early as the modern corporate system 
was established in the mid-19th century. Since the late 20th century, corporate governance 
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theories in law, economics, management, politics and sociology have offered competing 
diagnoses of and remedies for corporate governance ailments (Clarke, T., 2004; Keasey et al, 
1997). In the last two decades, for example, agency theory and stakeholder theory have gained 
popularity in corporate governance. Yet, the solutions they offered failed to resolve the 
problems they identified. The incentive schemes advocated by agency theory did not solve the 
agency problem, but created more governance problems (Wheatley, 2012). On the other side, 
stakeholder theory, as well as the concept of corporate social responsibility, did not change 
much the Anglo-American business landscape, and the sentiment of “business as usual” has 
always prevailed (Fleming and Jones, 2012). Stakeholder involvement in corporate 
governance has not been seriously treated in the Anglo-American corporate governance 
systems. Instead, the shareholder model has gained a great triumph since the 1980s with a 
significant worldwide influence (e.g., Coffee, 1999; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, 2012). 
Ironically, however, the recent financial crisis indicated that the shareholder model did not do 
well in practice and has appeared more negative than positive (e.g., Stout, 2012).     
Why has corporate governance failed in both theory and practice? This paper suggests 
that current corporate governance theories and competing perspectives, as well as thoughts for 
guiding governance reforms, are based on two different modes of thinking to search for the 
root causes of corporate governance problems and find relevant solutions. One is to look 
inward to the internal corporate governance systems with a focus on refining internal 
governance structures and mechanisms, such as the composition and functioning of boards 
and incentive schemes. On the contrary, the alternative mode of thinking is to look outward to 
the external institutional environments to find some determined causal factors. This paper 
critiques the two modes of thinking in corporate governance on the ground that although they 
may have some merits both modes of thinking are but a traditional convenient way of 
thinking: either internal or external, - a polarised and simplified theory construction. Both are 
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severely limited in understanding the more complicated institutional arrangements for 
corporate governance and both have failed to reveal how corporate governance is actually 
constructed in reality.  
The paper argues instead that corporate governance reality is not purely constructed 
internally, nor solely externally, but “inter-externally”. It means that it is the interconnection 
and interplay of internal and external governance forces and factors that plays a key role in 
shaping corporate governance: such as structures, mechanisms, values and cultures, and 
institutional arrangements. Accordingly, the root causes of corporate governance malfunctions 
need to be found at the intersection of internal and external corporate governance spheres. 
Here, “internal” and “external” are only used as convenient terms. In reality, the internal and 
external boundary is often blurred and fully dynamic. A critically reflexive mode of thinking 
is needed to recover the real face of corporate governance as a continuing political and social 
construct in context, rather than a naturally and universally generated or pre-given system or 
framework. Such a mode of thinking echoes somewhat Fiss’ (2008) call for a critically-
reflective thinking in corporate governance that would bring back all of the corporate 
constituents into the focus of corporate governance research and see how governance is 
constructed at the intersection of various influence spheres and how corporate actors actively 
manage such constituent groups. 
In the following sections, both inward-looking and outward-looking modes of thinking 
in corporate governance are identified and their limitations examined. Then, the alternative 
critically-reflexive mode of thinking in corporate governance is presented and its underlying 
theoretical foundations are provided. Key exemplary theses in the new and conventional 
modes of thinking are discussed and compared to illustrate the different understandings of 
corporate governance matters. A further discussion is given to the implications of the new 
mode of thinking for identifying the root causes of corporate governance defects and for a 
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future corporate governance reform agenda. The paper concludes with remarks on its 
contributions and further research directions.  
 
THE INWARD MODE OF THINKING IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The modern corporate governance system was formally established by corporate law 
and other related laws to govern key relationships among shareholders, directors and 
executive managers of the corporation. In corporate law, shareholders are treated as members 
of a corporation. Thus, shareholders can be regarded as “internal” players in corporate 
governance rather than “outsiders”. Such a normative legal framework is often taken for 
granted in mainstream governance thinking, as if corporate governance were only a matter of 
governance within the corporation or at the corporate level, concerning, for example, how the 
board is functioning in practice, how the relationships among the shareholders, directors and 
management can be strengthened or adjusted, and how the interests of managers and 
shareholders can be aligned.  
Over time, the internal governance framework prescribed by laws eventually becomes 
a constrained mode of thinking. A search of the internet and academic texts can find that the 
most common discussions about corporate governance are all related to such internal 
governance issues. The inward-looking mode of thinking is especially embedded in the 
dominant corporate governance theory - agency theory (e.g., Fama, 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), in which the only identified corporate governance problem is a universal 
agency problem. The key solution to it is to align the interest of managers with the interest of 
shareholders by strengthening the incentive system and introducing voluntary codes. External 
market mechanisms, like the market for corporate control, may be used to discipline 
managerial behaviour and thus enhance the internal governance system. The challenging 
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stakeholder theory (e.g., Blair, 1995; Freeman, 1984) does not go far away from the inward-
looking mode of thinking, as it believes that the frequent occurrence of corporate governance 
problems in the Anglo-American environment is largely due to the absence of stakeholder 
involvement in corporate governance. Its solution thus requests a revision of the internal 
structure of corporate governance, such as involving stakeholders in corporate decision-
making through stakeholder dialogue and consultation.  
Corporate governance reforms over the last two decades have reinforced such an 
inward mode of thinking. For instance, a series of UK corporate governance reports and codes 
(Cadbury, 1992; Financial Reporting Council, 2010; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 
2003; Turnbull, 1999; Walker, 2009) defined corporate governance only in terms of the role 
and functioning of the board and the rights of shareholders, which is copied in the new 
Corporate Governance Code of 2010:  
 
Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a company does and how it 
sets the values of the company, and is to be distinguished from the day to day 
operational management of the company by full-time executives. (The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: 1).   
 
This mode of thinking has been shared by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, 2004), as 
well as Corporate Governance Rating Systems, such as the Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGO) and its recent replacement, Governance Risk Indicators (GRId), the S&P Corporate 
Governance Score, the GMI rating system, and the Corporate Library’s Board Analyst 
(Barrett et al., 2004; Daines et al., 2010). All of them have drawn people’s attention to 
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internal governance affairs only, like board accountability, management responsibility and 
compensation, disclosure and transparency, and shareholders’ rights and equal treatment.   
While looking inward to search corporate governance issues at the corporate level, 
such a mode of thinking artificially builds a hard corporate boundary and isolates it from the 
sounding environments, and ignores the interconnection of the corporate internal governance 
system with the larger political, economic and socio-cultural systems in which it is located. 
Moreover, the inward-looking mode of thinking often treats corporate governance as naturally 
and universally occurred or pre-given and neglects corporate governance systems as 
institutionally designed and arranged on purpose and as a result of political and social 
constructions.   
 
THE OUTWARD MODE OF THINKING IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In recent years, corporate governance thinking has been advanced by several non-
conventional approaches and alternative perspectives, notably, the political model, the legal 
model, and the cultural model.  
The political model has gained significant influence in corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Cioffi and Höpner, 2006; Grundfest, 1990; Pound 1993; Roe, 1994, 2000, 2003). This 
model argues that macro-level political forces and factors largely determine a structural 
framework of corporate governance. Corporate governance arrangements do not rely on a 
simple economic rationality but on broader political contexts. As Roe posits it:  
 
Politics can affect a firm in many ways: it can determine who owns it, how big it can grow, 
what it can produce profitably, how it raises capital, who has the capital to invest, how 
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managers or employees see themselves and one another, and how authority is distributed 
inside the firm. (Roe, 2003: 1)   
 
Roe proposes a strong deterministic version of the political model, as he believes that 
the political determents tugging on the firm are “as strongly as the moon determines the 
tides.” (Roe, 2004: vi)  
The legal model emphasises the central role of a country’s legal system in shaping 
corporate governance. Many academics contend that the law is more deterministic in 
protecting minority shareholders and in influencing corporate finance and ownership 
structures (e.g., Beck et al., 2003; Cheffins, 2002; Choi, 2002; Coffee, 2001; Mahoney, 2001). 
The thesis was supported by large empirical research, particularly from the seminal work of 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002).    
The cultural model claims that national cultures play a key role in both the origin and 
the future development of corporate governance systems (e.g., Licht, 2001, 2004; Licht et al., 
2005; Tricker, 1990). It maintains that societal values, traditions, beliefs and assumptions may 
be more persistent than other factors in inducing path dependence and thus affect the 
development of corporate governance systems. Culture is viewed as the root cause of all of 
the difference (Landes, 2000).  
The alternative perspectives proposed by scholars in economics, law, politics and 
sociology commonly look outwards to the institutional environments and infrastructures of 
corporations and try to figure out how corporate governance is rooted in and determined by 
political, legal and socio-cultural institutions. This is generally in line with a macro-level 
institutional approach or a new institutional approach to corporate governance called upon 
recently in sociology (Davis, 2005; Fiss, 2008). While this is a great leap forward in corporate 
governance research (as it breaks with the inward-looking mode of thinking), however, there 
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are still actual and potential limits of such institutional approaches, such as dualism, 
determinism and the homeostatic nature of study.  
Dualism views corporations and their environments as two relatively independent 
systems separated by an artificially inserted systemic boundary. Therefore, corporations must 
fit and adapt to their environments to survive. This view, however, downplays the 
interconnection and inseparability of the corporate system and its environment, as discussed 
later in the paper.  
In association with dualism, determinism assumes that external and pre-existing 
environmental forces and factors can causally determine the formation and functioning of 
internal corporate governance. This is often seen in the recent argument that a single 
environmental element, such as a political or legal system, determines the system of corporate 
governance. But there are always counterarguments against any single determining variable. 
For example, Roe (2002) rejects legal determinism, while Coffee (2001) opposes political 
determinism. Furthermore, determinism refers to one-way thinking and a top-down approach, 
but the reality shows two-way interactions and mutual influences between the corporation and 
its surroundings. It is well recognised that major multinational corporations are economically 
more powerful than a single government (e.g., Korten, 2001). Thus, the sequence of which 
determines which is often a question. Environmental determinism looks single-minded.  
The institutional approaches to corporate governance tend to be homeostatic in nature, 
as they emphasise structures, consistence and stability, whilst downplaying processes, 
diversity and dynamics of institutional developments. This problem has already been 
recognised by institutional theorists. For instance, Scott (2007) suggests that early 
institutional theory in sociology overstated the monolithic structure of institutional 
environments exerting influence in a unilateral manner on compliant organisations. Peters 
(2000) identifies three common features of various institutional approaches in political 
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economy: (1) structures do matter, (2) structures persist while individuals come and go, and 
(3) structures create great regularity of human behaviour, which is predictable. Peters points 
out that the most important theoretical problem of institutional theory is the generally static 
nature of institutional explanations.              
 
A CRITICALLY-REFLEXIVE MODE OF THINKING IN  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
If the inward mode of thinking cannot see the woods for the trees, the current 
institutional approaches tend to look over the woods without seeing the trees (or neglect how 
the woods are configured by the trees). The common problem in both inward and outward 
modes of thinking is the artificial separation of the internal and external governance systems 
with a clear-cut boundary. Corporate governance is viewed as either an independent system or 
an internal system entirely depending on the external environments to determine its fortune. 
While research interests in governance bundles tend to see the substitutability and 
complementarity of internal and external governance mechanisms (e.g., Rediker and Seth, 
1995; Ward et al., 2009), the theory of governance bundles comes from an agency perspective 
and does not break up the internal-external boundary of governance systems.   
The proposed critically-reflexive mode of thinking aims to overcome such limitations 
in current corporate governance research. First, it dissolves the corporate hard boundary 
imposed by the inward and outward modes of thinking and sees corporate governance as a 
system interconnected between the corporation and its political, social, cultural and economic 
environments. Fundamental problems of corporate governance often emerge from the 
interface of “internal” and “external” governance systems and processes where various 
corporate constituents and other players interact and interplay, rather than purely from inside 
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or outside the corporation. Second, corporate governance is not a universally and naturally 
given system, but a political and social construct in a societal context which emerges at the 
intersection of various influence spheres from all of corporate constituents and managing 
actors (Fiss, 2008). Third, this new mode of thinking has a sense of not just looking inward, 
outward and across, but also backward and forward to see how corporate governance has 
contextually and conditionally emerged and changed over time towards uncertain future. 
In the critically reflexive mode of thinking, corporate governance is defined as 
continuous processes of ordering and controlling actions and activities generated in corporate 
inter-relational webs through collectively constructed governing rules and instruments. 
Corporate governance aims at channelling corporate activities towards certain ends, and in so 
doing it is continuously shaped and reshaped by the dynamic interrelationships of all 
governing actors and players in and around the corporation. Three key characteristics of the 
governing processes underpin the critically reflexive mode of thinking, namely, wholeness, 
interconnectedness and emergence.      
Wholeness. Corporate governance is explicitly and implicitly intricate in the entire 
political, economic and socio-cultural system in a society where the macroprocesses of 
governance organise the microprocesses into a systemic whole, and the two level governing 
processes are interlinked and coordinated rather than separated and isolated. Governance 
system at the corporate level is but a subsystem of the whole political, economic and socio-
cultural system in a society, or a part of the “metagovernance” system (i.e., governance of 
governance, a term used by Jessop (2002) and Kooiman (2003)). Understanding the reality of 
corporate governance, its issues, problems and solutions needs a holistic and contextual 
approach. This view is strongly supported by Meisel’s (2004) study on corporate governance 
culture in France. He points out that “one cannot understand a country’s institutions of 
corporate governance outside their interaction with their socio-political environment and, 
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especially, with the country’s institutions of political governance” (Meisel, 2004: 69). It is 
short-sighted to see corporate governance institutions isolated from the societal governance 
culture in which they are embedded (Meisel, 2004: 93). 
Interconnectedness. A relational approach is often highlighted in the conventional 
economic and legal models of corporate governance. For instance, the corporation is 
commonly regarded as a “nexus of contracts” (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), involving relational exchanges between rational 
principals and agents and other participants in the organisation. Yet, such a relationship 
concept is only a simple linkage and connection between separate entities and parts. In the 
critically reflexive mode of thinking, the concept of “interrelationship” is derived from 
process philosophy, which views the “internal” and “external” governance systems not as 
separated entities, but as interconnected processes, both of which are interdependent or 
functionally conjoined elements/parts in a systemic whole (see Sun, 2009). In such an 
interrelationship, each element intermingles and interpenetrates with others throughout the 
whole of space or a system, each embodies aspects of all of the others, and each contains the 
information of the whole (Bohm, 1980; G. W. Leibniz, in Rescher, 1996: 37). In this respect, 
the corporation is not simply a collection of contracts between different parties, but a locus of 
interrelationships between all of the participants and actors, where their interests are 
intertwined and complicated, and their interconnections and mutual influences are beyond 
purely contracts or market exchanges.  
Emergence. The emerging nature of corporate governance highlights the changing, 
evolving, dynamic and complex nature of corporate governance reality that is rooted in the 
living experiences and interactions and in instantly renewing interrelations of corporate 
governing participants and actors. While continuously developing over time, the governing 
interrelationships have a trace of dynamically stabilised patterns manifested in a certain 
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format or shape, such as in specific forms and structures of corporate governance. The 
changing and emerging interrelationships can never be predefined by abstract assumptions 
and ideal models, nor truly caught by post-event rules and regulations, although socially 
constructed ideological and regulatory frameworks may reweave the values and beliefs of 
corporate governing participants and actors through interactions.  
 
ILLUSTRATION: EXEMPLARY THESES IN THREE MODES OF THINKING 
 
In this section, the critically reflexive mode of thinking is applied to corporate 
governance practices to generate a few exemplary theses at the three levels of corporate 
governance: regulatory governance, market governance and stakeholder governance, a 
framework used by Sun et al. (2011). The understandings of corporate governance issues in 
the critically reflexive mode of thinking are compared with the understandings in other two 
modes of thinking in order to see the fundamental differences among them. The exemplary 
theses are for illustration only and do not exhaust all the potential theses to be generated there.   
In the inward-looking mode of thinking, the internal governance system is separate 
from the external environment in the first place and then mechanically linked to it. Thus, 
external governance on the corporation is often regarded as an extra burden, or a restraint, 
something imposed on or added to internal governance from outside. Scholars and researchers 
who concentrate on refining the internal governance framework often argue against strong 
regulation, market restriction and stakeholder participation in corporate governance, and are 
in turn in favour of self-regulation, free market competition and instrumental stakeholder 
management. On the other side, in the outward-looking mode of thinking, regulatory, market 
and stakeholder forces seem to be much more deterministic in shaping the internal governance 
landscape. People thinking in this way often assume or assert firms’ compliance (willing or 
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unwilling) with regulations, the overwhelming power of market forces in disciplining 
corporate behaviour and performance, and the importance of stakeholder pressure and 
influence on corporate decision making.   
In the critically-reflexive mode of thinking, however, the key governance issues 
identified are quite different from those in the inward and outward modes of thinking. Three 
exemplary theses in regulatory governance, market governance and stakeholder governance 
are illustrated below.  
Thesis One: The Business-Political Nexus. In terms of regulatory governance, neither 
self-regulation (from the inward mode of thinking) nor compliance (from the outward mode 
of thinking) can be seen as somewhat ideal, pre-given and/or taken-for-granted governance 
mechanisms, but simply as particular types of institutional arrangements in a society at a 
given time. The key question is how the institutional arrangements are actually made in 
reality. The assertion is that neither corporations nor external regulators alone can simply 
make such arrangements. Self-regulation or state regulation is often a result of the interplay 
between corporations and regulatory forces (plus pressure groups sometimes). This is 
frequently evidenced in corporate lobbying for or against certain regulations (which is termed 
“regulatory capture” in economics, e.g., Stigler, 1971) and lobbying for widely advocated 
deregulation and self-regulation. It is also evidenced in firms’ close link to political parties 
and politicians. For instance, following Olson (1982, 1996), Edwards (2009) demonstrates 
that the City of London (the financial centre or sector) has long been a powerful rent-seeking 
interest group, a “distributional coalition”, with its overriding objective to redistribute income 
and wealth to itself and to maximise its profits in the short term. One of the important means 
for this purpose is self-regulation, that is, free of government intervention in general and 
restrictive practices legislation in particular. The City has very successfully secured the self-
regulation policy since the 19th century through its close relationship with the Bank of 
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England and H. M. Treasury, known as the “City-Bank-Treasury nexus or axis” or the C-B-T 
nexus. The nexus is an interdependent political-business league, where each party’s interests 
and objectives depend on the other two parties to fulfil. With the C-B-T nexus, the City has 
long been able to influence state decision-making at the highest levels.  
Cioffi and Höpner (2006) also note that the formation of the post-war political 
economy and corporate governance frameworks was largely the political expedience, personal 
economic interest and ideological conviction of the centre-right parties in the West. The 
favour for managerialism was “the legacy of class-based party formation [that] embodied 
long-standing alliances between centre-right parties and corporate managers” and the close 
personal and professional ties between them (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006: 486). Ideologically, 
the centre-right has had a historical affinity with employers’ interests against working class 
interests.  
Thesis Two: Market Inefficiency and Manipulation. In terms of market governance, 
many people (though not all) in the inward and outward modes of thinking tend to have a 
genuine faith in market efficiency and/or market determinism, and claim that disclosure, 
transparency and market discipline are effective corporate governance mechanisms. However, 
the efficient market hypothesis has to rely on an even flow of information through to the 
market, but this is not the case in reality. Schwarcz (2011), for example, reveals that in the 
United States although most of the risks were disclosed in the financial market before the 
financial crisis as required by the federal regulations, the disclosure was ineffective due to 
information asymmetry and information failure. For Schwarcz, information asymmetry and 
failure is the direct cause of market inefficiency. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in 
economics, holds a similar view that “information imperfections are central in finance” and 
“when information is imperfect, markets do not often work well” (Stiglitz, 2009: 9). In a 
recent government-backed review of the UK equity markets and long-term decision making, 
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Kay (2012) criticises the efficient market hypothesis and argues that it provides a poor basis 
for either regulation or investment. It also drives short-term decisions by investors at the 
expense of corporate long-term growth and the whole economy.    
In the critically reflexive mode of thinking, markets are not merely economic 
exchange places based on purely calculative and deterministic economic conditions, as 
assumed in classical and neo-classical economics. Rather, markets are social constructs, the 
results of socially interactive and interrelated processes, which are not simply and 
straightforwardly rational and efficient (Fligstein, 1990; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 
1994; Rescher, 1988; Roy, 1997). Rather than disciplining corporate management, the 
marketplace is an extension of corporate management’s power and interests. This is usually 
done through market manipulation by corporations and their close alliances in the markets, 
such as securities analysts, auditors, accounting firms, lawyers and ratings agencies, with 
deliberate attempts to create artificial, false or misleading information or appearances of 
trades in the markets for securities, commodities or currencies to control and gain from the 
markets (Sears, 1997). The Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal in 2001 proved this case. The 
2008 financial crisis was also caused by market manipulation, in which hedge funds within 
commercial banks and investment banks played a significant role (Stein, 2008; for a typical 
evidence of market manipulation during the financial crisis, see Misra et al. 2012). The recent 
scandal of the inter-banking rate fixing by Barclays and many other banks is another example 
of market manipulation in the financial crisis. Therefore, for Stein (2008), Wall Street has 
changed “from a financing entity to a market manipulation entity”.  
Thesis Three: Stakeholder Manipulation and Conflict of Interest. In the inward mode 
of thinking, stakeholder interests are ignored or treated purely as an instrument for corporate 
strategic management. There is little room for considering wider stakeholder interests in the 
shareholder model. By contrast, the outward mode of thinking believes that stakeholder forces 
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are so powerful in determining/influencing corporate governance and performance that 
corporations seem to be subordinated to stakeholder pressures. However, evidence shows that 
this claim may not be true in reality (Letza et al., 2004). Large corporations are not passive, 
but active, in response to institutional/stakeholder pressures and expectations. Corporate 
active role has long been neglected by institutional theory (Oliver, 1991). As mentioned 
previously, corporations may build close ties with politicians and regulators to manipulate 
regulations and may form coalitions with key market players to manipulate markets. In short, 
corporations may collude with one or a few of stakeholder groups to pursue gains at the costs 
of all others.  
The attempt to co-opt, influence or control institutional and stakeholder pressures and 
evaluations is termed the “manipulation strategy” by Oliver (1991), who identifies several 
strategies used by organisations in response to institutional processes. With the manipulation 
strategy, corporations may co-opt the source of the stakeholder pressure by, for example, 
persuading key stakeholder groups’ representatives to join the corporation or its board of 
directors, or opportunistically use institutional links and ties to seek external supports. 
Corporations may influence institutionalised values and beliefs or definitions and criteria of 
acceptable practices and performances. Corporations may directly control stakeholder 
pressures by, for instance, controlling the budgetary processes used to assess the value of 
corporate social and economic contributions, or by striving to alter the way in which corporate 
achievements and transgressions are announced to the public (Oliver, 1991: 157-159).   
In the stakeholder manipulation process, conflicts of interest are inevitable. A conflict 
of interests occurs when professional judgment or actions regarding a primary interest of the 
profession are unduly influenced by a secondary interest of the same profession (Thompson, 
1993). When professions, such as auditors and rating agencies, are paid by companies to 
evaluate the same companies’ financial reports, asset values or performance, a conflict of 
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interest occurs. If the professions also provide additional services, such as consultancy and 
advice, to the same companies, the conflict of interest could be severe. For instance, prior to 
the 2008 financial crisis, the rating agencies were involved in advising companies how to 
structure derivatives to get desired ratings. This presented serious conflicts of interest 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). It is commonly believed that the sharp contrast between the very rosy 
ratings before the financial crisis and the dramatic downgrades at the beginning of the 
financial crisis contributed to the global financial meltdown (e.g., Clarke, T., 2011; FCIC, 
2011).   
A brief summary of the above-mentioned key theses in the three modes of thinking is 
shown in Table 1. The different understandings of corporate governance issues are seen 
strikingly.     
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The critically reflexive mode of thinking points to a deep understanding of corporate 
governance problems in practice, which is fundamentally different from the current 
mainstream or popular understandings. It believes that the core problems of corporate 
governance are not purely from within corporations, nor solely determined by external 
institutions, but emerged from the interplay of corporations and various institutional players, 
including political, legal, market and other key stakeholder players. Surely, an interplay of the 
influential forces may have either positive or negative impacts on corporate governance, 
depending on what intentions those players hold and how well the internal and external forces 
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in play are checked and balanced and publically monitored in a democratic society. If the 
dependent conditions are weak, the negative impacts would surpass the positive impacts (if 
any).  
The current dominant mode of thinking and resultant corporate governance reforms, 
while focused on the internal governance system, fail to address the issues at the intersection 
of the internal and external governance spheres and fail to recognise the practices of corporate 
governance have actually been “captured” by the interlink and interplay of internal and 
external governing forces. This is the root cause of the persistent corporate governance 
problems that have not been touched in corporate governance reforms over the last two 
decades. It is important that corporate governance reforms need to address the failures in 
regulatory, market and stakeholder governance, rather than internal governance alone. Reform 
priority should be given to such key issues as regulatory capture, market manipulation and 
stakeholders’ conflict of interests.    
As the world is fundamentally interconnected, businesses cannot be isolated from 
political systems. Instead, businesses are embedded locally in political, economic and social 
institutions; and vice versa, political and social relations are embedded in business and the 
economic system (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 2001; for an updated literature review on the 
concept of embeddedness, see Heidenreich, 2012). However, if a business-political link 
generates negative consequences that are harmful to the economy and society as a whole, 
measures must be taken to protect the whole system and the general public. In recent years, 
there have been increasing studies on regulatory capture since Stigler (1971). A new 
collection of papers edited by Pagliari (2012) has addressed the regulatory capture issue more 
substantially, based on perspectives from academics, regulators and stakeholders. The book 
presents three broad policy approaches to mitigate the risk of regulatory capture. Firstly, it is 
needed to rebalance the participation of stakeholders and to strengthen the plurality of voices 
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in the regulatory process. The regulatory participation process should be fair, transparent, 
accessible, and open. Secondly, regulatory agencies should be granted an independent status 
by statute, and then the regulatory processes should be insulated from the political horse-
trading and short-term pressures of politicians. Thirdly, the regulatory processes should be 
opened to different external checks and balances to ensure that regulatory authorities are 
constantly supervised, held accountable, and challenged. While the above suggestions and 
measures sound rational and reasonable, some deeper issues remain little touched in the book. 
For example, who will regulate the regulators and how? Who, then, will regulate the 
regulators of regulators and how? If unfair and perverse business lobbying, political 
donations, and close-door business-political trades are permitted either explicitly or implicitly, 
regulatory capture is hardly resolvable. The core issue is more related to the existing 
complication of business-political interlink system, what Harvard Law School Professor 
Lawrence Lessig (2011) calls “a legal but corrupt system”, a system that needs to be deeply 
reformed to be more open, just, transparent and democratic.  
Free market looks ideal for corporate governance only if widespread market 
manipulation is effectively contained. Market manipulation was a major concern during the 
Great Depression. Major legislation and regulations was laid down in the 1930s and thereafter 
to prevent market manipulation and fraud. However, the deregulation movement that began in 
the 1980s changed the business regulatory landscape and provided opportunities for market 
abuse. The only way to prevent market abuse is to impose restricted rules with criminal 
penalties. Self-regulation did not work and will not work. Only financial penalties are not 
enough, as the imposed fines are usually far less than the benefits accrued from the market 
manipulation. The manipulators simply walked away with no time served. Remarking on the 
Barclay’s Libor manipulation scandal, the UK Business secretary Vince Cable pointed out 
that the public “just can’t understand why people are thrown in jail for petty theft and these 
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guys just walk away having perpetrated what looks like conspiracy” (Muñoz and Colchester, 
2012). In response to the Enron scandal, the unprecedented tough legislation of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 did increase criminal penalties for manipulation, destruction or alteration 
of financial records or other interference with investigations. But, the Act was designed only 
to ensure the accuracy and transparency of corporate financial information. It did nothing to 
prevent market abuse and manipulation outside corporate accounting and auditing. Still, there 
is a large regulatory vacuum in the markets that awaits the attention of legislators.  
Proper regulations are also needed to prevent conflict of interests and corporate-
stakeholder collusions that may act against the public interest. Regulations should set clear 
guidance or procedures for organisations and professionals to remove, avoid, disclose, and 
recuse themselves from conflict of interests in every industry, sector and professional field. 
Corporate-stakeholder collusions of any type against the public interest should be prohibited. 
The key regulatory issue should relate to some ambiguous and controversial areas in which 
wrongdoings from conflict of interests are not kept in check or punished. If rating agencies, 
for example, give incorrect, inaccurate, biased or misleading ratings, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, due to conflict of interests, what penalties should they receive? Although 
credit rating agencies clearly knew about Enron’s problems for months, they kept its rating at 
investment grade until four days before its bankruptcy (Borrus, 2002). Yet, those rating 
agencies did not receive any punishment. After Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requested only that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) develop a review report 
on how credit ratings are used in the American regulatory scheme and the policy issues 
arising from that use. The Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006 and the SEC’s implementation 
of the Act in 2007 simply relied on rating agencies themselves to establish policies and 
procedures to avoid conflict of interests, to disclose conflict of interests to the public, and to 
furnish the SEC with an additional report about the number of credit rating actions 
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(Parmeggiani, 2012). Nothing serious was done until the 2008 financial crisis in which the 
credit rating agencies played an important role. In 2011, the SEC made a major proposal to 
remove credit ratings as one of the conditions for companies seeking to use short-form 
registration when registering securities for public sale (SEC, 2011). In early 2012, the 
European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee proposed that credit ratings 
be removed from European Union laws for regulatory purposes (Ryan, 2012). Obviously, 
regulation has not done enough to control improper corporate-stakeholder collusions and 
conflicts of interests.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current inward and outward modes of thinking severely limit and constrain our 
understandings of corporate governance systems and problems and are thus unable to properly 
diagnose and rectify corporate governance defects and malfunctions in practice. The decade-
long corporate governance reforms informed by the dominant inward-looking mode of 
thinking failed to prevent a systemic failure of corporate governance in the 2008 financial 
crisis. Overcoming the limitations of the existing modes of thinking, the proposed critically 
reflexive mode of thinking enables us to break the boundary of internal corporate governance 
system and external institutional environments and avoid a simplistic “either or” approach to 
look into core corporate governance problems. It allows us to trace the core corporate 
governance issues that resides at the intersection of internal and external governance spheres 
with an interplay by corporate powers and political, market and other key stakeholder players. 
When three key exemplary theses are emerged and examined at the regulatory, market and 
stakeholder governance levels, this new mode of thinking immediately captures such deep 
problems of corporate governance as regulatory capture, market manipulation and stakeholder 
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manipulation and conflict of interests, which are rarely discussed in contemporary corporate 
governance research. This mode of thinking points to a new direction in corporate governance 
research and a clearer agenda for effective corporate governance reforms.   
While the exemplary theses generated are for illustration only, the paper is not 
possible to examine a full spectrum of theses that might emerge from the interlink and 
interplay of internal and external governance systems and forces. Therefore, in search of the 
root causes of corporate governance problems, this paper only concentrates on a selected few. 
Moreover, the possible positive sides of the interlink and interplay are not discussed in the 
paper. All those leave a sufficient space for a further comprehensive research on the interface 
of internal and external governance systems and processes and on the role corporations have 
played and will continue to play in a society. This requires a much broadened thinking and 
more integrated multidisciplinary research on corporate governance beyond the current 
constraints (Clarke, T., 2007; Letza et al., 2008; Monks and Minow, 2001; Sun et al., 2011).      
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TABLE 1 
 
Exemplary Theses in Different Modes of Thinking 
 
 The Inward-Looking 
Mode of Thinking 
The Outward-
Looking Mode of 
Thinking 
The Critically-Reflexive 
Mode of Thinking   
Regulatory 
Governance 
Self-regulation Compliance  Business-political nexus 
Regulatory capture 
Market 
Governance 
Free market exchange     Market discipline  Market manipulation 
Market inefficiency/failure  
Stakeholder 
Governance 
Stakeholder 
management    
Stakeholder 
power/influence   
Stakeholder manipulation/co-
option  
Stakeholders’ conflicts of 
interest  
 
 
